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A PROMISE UNFULFILLED: CHALLENGES TO 
GEORGIA’S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE POST-
FURMAN 
William Cody Newsome 
INTRODUCTION 
William Henry Furman was twenty-nine years old when he was 
convicted for the murder of William Joseph Micke, Jr., on September 
20, 1968.1 After a trial lasting a single day, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict along with a death sentence.2 The only evidence presented to 
the jury was a conflicting account of the events,3 and Furman’s age 
and race.4 On appeal, Furman’s counsel argued Georgia law created 
an arbitrary death penalty because it failed to distinguish the present 
crime “from thousands of others for which the death penalty is not 
inflicted.”5 
In Furman v. Georgia, 6  the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with 
Furman’s counsel. 7  Three Justices agreed that Georgia law, as 
applied, was arbitrary and potentially discriminatory.8 Moreover, one 
                                                                                                                 
J.D. Candidate, 2017, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank every member of 
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family: I wish I could thank you in the manner you deserve, but I can’t. All I can say is that I will be 
eternally grateful to Him and to you for pushing me to be a better man and giving me a model to live by. 
 1. Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (No. 71-5003). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 5–6. A detective, who questioned Furman after the arrest, testified that Furman said he 
fired a shot as he was fleeing the house. Id. Furman denied making this statement. Id. Instead, Furman 
claimed the gun accidentally discharged when he tripped as he fled from the house. Id. 
 4. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 12. The jury was not given information on Furman’s mental 
capacity. Id. Only weeks after the alleged murder, Furman was institutionalized at the Georgia Central 
State Hospital in Milledgeville, Georgia. Id. at 9. Months before the trial, the Superintendent of the 
Hospital reported mental deficiency with psychotic episodes that would inhibit his ability to assist his 
defense counsel at trial. Id. Moreover, evidence that Furman had only earned a sixth grade level of 
education was also not admitted. Id. at 10 n. 9. 
 5. Brief for Petitioner supra note 1, at 11–12. 
 6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 7. Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., 
concurring). 
 8. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[W]e know that the discretion of judges and 
juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied . . .”); id. at 309 
1
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Justice challenged the value of the death penalty and doubted it 
served any of the alleged purposes for which it was employed.9 The 
challenges of five Justices in Furman opened the floodgates for 
additional legal challenges to the death penalty. 
Since Furman, the Court has ruled on various legal procedures 
involved in the process of execution.10 Each challenge illustrates the 
Court’s evolving understanding of “cruel and unusual punishment,”11 
and what that means for the viability of the death penalty in America. 
With each new standard the Court imposes, the marginal benefits of 
imposing the death penalty are diminished. 12  Faced with the 
challenges of imposing the death penalty, nineteen states and the 
                                                                                                                 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“In the first place, it is clear that these sentences are ‘cruel’ in the sense that 
they excessively go beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that the state legislatures have 
determined to be necessary. In the second place, it is equally clear that these sentences are ‘unusual’ in 
the sense that the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder . . . . These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.” (citations 
omitted)); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years 
of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state 
criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That conclusion . . . is that the 
death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it 
is not.”). 
 9. Furman, 408 U.S. at 342–58 (Marshall, J., concurring); see infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding a statute unconstitutional that 
authorized the death penalty for aggravated rape of a child without a resulting death); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the 
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”); Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding “a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury,” violates the 
sixth amendment when the judge finds the “aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of the 
death penalty”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (concluding the eighth amendment does 
not preclude the execution of mentally retarded individuals), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 321 (2002) (“Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving 
standards of decency,’” the court held the death penalty is excessive for a mentally retarded offender); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit 
the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.”); McCleskey 
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 29–93 (1987) (holding that a greater number of executions of black-on-white 
murderers versus white-on-black murderers does not establish racial discrimination without 
“discriminatory purpose”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”); Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding the death penalty for rape of an adult woman is “grossly 
disproportionate and excessive punishment . . . and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as 
cruel and unusual punishment”). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 12. Ralph Dellapiana, Should We put the Death Penalty on the Chopping Block?, 22 UTAH BAR J. 
24, 24 (2009); see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
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District of Columbia have simply abolished the punishment 
altogether.13 
Although many challenges subsequent to Furman have been raised 
and arguably resolved by the Court, the underlying challenges raised 
by Furman appear to remain prevalent with the Court. Justice Breyer 
recently echoed the concurring opinions of Furman in his dissenting 
opinion from Glossip v. Gross, when he stated: “In this world, or at 
least in this Nation, we can have a death penalty that at least arguably 
serves legitimate penological purposes or we can have a procedural 
system that at least arguably seeks reliability and fairness in the death 
penalty’s application. We cannot have both.”14 
This Note will explore both sides of Justice Breyer’s contention in 
Glossip. Part I will establish a brief history of the death penalty in the 
United States and the constitutional limits imposed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 15  Part I will also discuss Furman v. 
Georgia and establish the constitutional principles that result from 
that decision. 
Part II will analyze Justice Breyer’s contention in Glossip by first 
looking to whether contemporary death penalty systems serve a 
“penological purpose,” 16  and then whether the systems of 
Connecticut17 or Maryland fail to achieve “reliability and fairness in 
[their respective] application.” 18  Part II will conclude with an 
additional study conducted in Georgia, which reinforces similar 
findings in Connecticut and Maryland regarding their respective 
issues with the death penalty.19 Finally, Part III will examine whether 
Georgia can improve its death penalty system and what steps it 
should take to eliminate the issues articulated in Furman.20 
                                                                                                                 
 13. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last modified July 1, 2015). 
 14. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 15. See discussion infra Part I.B–C. 
 16. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see discussion infra Part II.A. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 18. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see discussion infra Part II.C. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 20. See discussion infra Part III. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The death penalty has developed as a result of general reforms,21 
but more importantly through federal interpretations of common and 
constitutional law.22 
A. Federal Interpretations of Common and Constitutional Law 
Due to death penalty system reforms, the punishment was in a 
relative state of flux between 1900 and 1960 in the United States.23 
However, the Supreme Court attempted to combat that flux by 
shaping the developments of modern death penalty laws through the 
lens of common law and the Fifth, 24  Eighth, 25  and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution.26 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Frederick C. Millett, Will the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the World) in 
Abandoning Capital Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 547, 586–87 (2008). The reforms included: 
“(1) the use of more humane methods of execution, (2) the prohibition of public 
executions to protect the public from exposure to the death penalty, (3) the 
development of ‘degrees’ of murder where only the highest degree of murder 
received the death penalty, and (4) the use of jury discretion to choose the death 
penalty instead of the mandatory sentence of death.” 
Id. These reforms reflected the evolving standards of society, allowing it to remain prevalent in the 
United States. Id. at 586. 
 22. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 23. Millett, supra note 21, at 589. Millett noted: 
By 1917, twelve states had abolished the death penalty, though ‘under the nervous 
tension of World War I, four of those States reinstituted’ it. By the end of World 
War II, ‘[t]he manner of inflicting death changed, and the horrors of the 
punishment were, therefore, somewhat diminished in the minds of the general 
public’ and, as a result, nothing much happened until many decades later. 
Between the years 1900 and 1966, an estimated 7226 judicial executions were 
carried out in the United States. In addition, by the end of the 1960s, forty-one 
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government all allowed the death 
penalty for at least one crime. As late as the 1960s, crimes punishable by the 
death penalty in at least two states included the following crimes: murder, treason, 
kidnapping, rape, statutory rape, robbery, bombing, assault with a deadly weapon 
by a life term prisoner, train wrecking, burglary, arson, perjury in a capital case, 
espionage, machine gunning, and other particular forms of assault. 
Notwithstanding, the number of executions began to decline: twenty-one in 1963, 
fifteen in 1964, seven in 1965, and only three between 1966 and 1967. 
Id. at 589–90. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (disallowing the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment”). The 
fluctuating understanding of the death penalty may be demonstrated with two cases. In Wilkerson v. 
Utah, the Court upheld public shootings as a permissible form of execution because it was a common 
4
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First, in Weems v. United States, 27  the Court established the 
constitutional requirement for proportionality between the crime and 
punishment.28 Second, the Court decided Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber,29 where it held that the Constitution prohibited cruelty in 
the method of execution, not the suffering as a result of being 
sentenced to death.30 Third, in Trop v. Dulles,31 the Court stated that 
its understanding of cruel and unusual punishment develops along 
with society.32 Trop was pivotal in that it established a standard of 
“decency . . . of a maturing society,”33 opening the door for the Court 
to eventually rule the process unconstitutional altogether. These cases 
largely guided the Court in death penalty cases like Furman and 
beyond. 
B. Pre-Furman to Post-Furman 
Following Trop, six characteristics of the death penalty bearing 
constitutional significance became evident across numerous death 
                                                                                                                 
method used for “soldiers convicted of desertion or other capital military offences . . . .” 99 U.S. 130, 
135 (1878). “Wilkerson seemed to suggest that a severe punishment is not cruel and unusual if it had 
been commonly performed in the past.” Millett, supra note 21, at 591. However, in another late 19th 
century case, In Re Kemmler, the Court approved electrocution as a permissible method of execution 
even though it was an uncommon practice. 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890). “In re Kemmler seemed to suggest 
that although an execution method is unusual, or uncommon, it is still constitutional if enacted by the 
legislature as a more human way to administer the death penalty.” Millett, supra note 21, at 591. These 
two cases demonstrate conflicting rulings in early death penalty analysis. 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”); see also Millett, supra note 21, at 590–91. 
 27. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 28. Id. at 368 (conceding that punishment may be so disproportionate to the offense that such 
punishment may be cruel and unusual). This case marked an early recognition by the Court that the 
death penalty should be reserved for the worst offenses in order to maintain proportionality. 
Proportionality is significant when evaluating the arbitrary imposition of death across cases. 
 29. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
 30. Id. at 464 (“Petitioner’s suggestion is that because he once underwent the psychological strain of 
electrocution, now to require him to undergo this preparation again subjects him to a lingering or cruel 
and unusual punishment. Even the fact that petitioner has already been subjected to a current of 
electricity does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any 
other execution.”). 
 31. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 32. Id. at 101. 
 33. Id. 
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penalty schemes throughout the United States. 34  The first 
characteristic defining the death penalty was the discretion granted to 
sentencing juries without any standards to ensure consistent results.35 
Second, a large number of people became eligible for the death 
penalty because of the large number of chargeable capital crimes.36 
These facts also related to the third characteristic where the number 
of people sentenced to death and numbers of people actually 
executed were “remarkably small.” 37  The fourth characteristic in 
many states was the limitation of appellate jurisdiction to “special 
legal errors,” that did not include the “reasonableness of a death 
sentence,” in any given case.38  The fifth characteristic commonly 
prevalent was a “very high proportion of nonwhite defendants 
sentenced to death.” 39  Finally, the sixth characteristic dealt with 
multiple points of discretion throughout the process of prosecution 
that lead to the death penalty.40 The Supreme Court addressed each of 
these characteristics in Furman.41 
                                                                                                                 
 34. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 7–9 (1990). 
 35. Id. at 7–8. The level of discretion granted to juries has been found to be the root of many 
constitutional issues in contemporary death penalty system face. See discussion infra Part II.C.2 
(discussing jury discretionary issues in Maryland). Moreover, problems in Georgia’s death penalty 
system have been directly attributed to discretion granted to juries when deciding whether or not to 
impose death or life in prison. See discussion infra Part II.D.2. 
 36. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 7. 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. This disproportionate application of death penalty laws persisted following the Furman 
decision, at least in Maryland and Georgia. See discussion infra Parts II.C.2, II.D.2. 
 40. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 7. Similar to discretion granted to juries, the process of prosecuting a 
capital case and the discretion throughout that process is directly attributed to constitutional issues in 
contemporary death penalty systems. See discussion infra Parts II.C.2, II.D.2; see also infra text 
accompanying note 174. 
 41. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309–10 
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring); id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring); 
BALDUS, supra note 34, at 9, 12. Furman was not the Court’s first attempt to address these issues. See, 
e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 203–20 (1971). In McGautha, California’s death penalty 
was challenged because it did not provide juries with standards to impose the punishment. Id. at 185. 
Ultimately, the Court held such standards were unnecessary because the states were entitled to assume 
jurors would responsibly impose the sentence given its’ consequences. Id. at 208. The Court’s reasoning 
was based in “a strong deference to the independent sovereignty of the states and the principles of 
federalism.” BALDUS, supra note 34, at 11. McGautha was effectively overruled by Furman. Furman, 
408 U.S. at 400. 
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1. Furman v. Georgia 
The Court in Furman issued a single paragraph per curiam opinion 
invalidating the death penalty laws of Georgia and Texas. 42 
Unfortunately, each Justice wrote his own concurring or dissenting 
opinion, leaving little clear guidance for future courts. Three of the 
Justices agreed that as applied 43  the death penalty was 
unconstitutional in the United States. 44  However, two Justices 
challenged the assumption of the death penalty’s constitutionality and 
for the first time ruled that it is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual 
punishment. 45  The four dissenting Justices relied on principles of 
federalism when upholding the laws of Georgia and Texas.46 
As applied, Justice Douglas found that the death penalty 
impermissibly targeted poor, black Americans unequally,47 and thus, 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.48 
Justice Stewart implicitly rejected the federalism argument, finding 
jury discretion without standards violated the Eighth Amendment 
because there was no way to distinguish the “capriciously selected 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. A per curiam opinion is defined as “[a]n opinion handed down by 
an appellate court without identifying the individual judge who wrote the opinion.” Per Curiam 
Opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Per curiam opinions are significant because they, 
“by their very nature, obscure the author of an opinion.” Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of 
Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1212 (2012). In 
Furman v. Georgia, where there is a five-person majority, it is impossible to know which Justice’s 
reasoning should apply to future cases without knowing the author of the Court’s opinion. Id. 
 43. As-applied challenges occur when litigants “raise a constitutional objection to a 
statute . . . assert[ing] that the statute’s application to [their specific] case violates the Constitution.” 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1321, 1327 (2000) (emphasis omitted). As a result, the Court may “engage in reasoning that marks the 
statute as unenforceable in its totality.” Id. at 1327–28. 
 44. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 
314 (White, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359–60 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 46. Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 47. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible 
‘caste’ aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of the judges 
and juries . . . enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices 
against the . . . poor and despised, and . . . member[s] of a suspect or unpopular 
minority . . . . 
Id. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; BALDUS, supra note 34, at 12. 
7
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random handful,” chosen to die from those that were not.49 Justice 
White viewed the death penalty as constitutional only if it advanced 
some penological purpose. 50  However, he found that the death 
penalty as applied did not serve such a purpose because of three 
reasons: (1) the extreme infrequency of use, (2) the alternative of 
lengthy incarceration, and (3) the impossibility of determining why 
some defendants were sentenced to death while others, convicted of 
the same crimes, were not.51 
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concluded the death penalty 
was unconstitutional in any circumstance.52 Justice Brennan further 
concluded current laws created the potential for degradation of 
human dignity,53 relying on four principles to evaluate the level of 
degradation the punishment created.54 Following Justice Brennan’s 
lead, Justice Marshall echoed the four principles and evaluated six 
purposes the death penalty allegedly served. 55  Justice Marshall 
considered: (1) retribution, (2) deterrence, (3) prevention of 
recidivism, (4) encouragement of confessions and guilty pleas, (5) 
eugenics, and (6) economic reasons.56 He then rejected each of these 
purposes as illegitimate to retain the death penalty.57 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 
12. 
 50. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring); see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 12. 
Such purposes include: “incapacitation, general deterrence, or . . . retribution.” Id. 
 51. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring); see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 12. 
Each of these three problems pointed out by Justice White arguably persist in the contemporary death 
penalty system operating in Georgia. See discussion infra Part II.D.1–2. 
 52. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also 
BALDUS, supra note 34, at 12. 
 53. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Millett, supra note 21, at 593. 
 54. Furman, 408 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The test, then, will ordinarily be a 
cumulative one: if a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted 
arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that 
it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment . . . .”). 
 55. Id. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Millett, supra note 21, at 593. 
 56. Furman, 408 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Millett, supra note 21, at 593–94. 
 57. Furman, 408 U.S. at 342–60 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall rejected retribution because 
scholars had rejected it and “[t]he history of the Eighth Amendment supports only the conclusion that 
retribution for its own sake is improper.” Id. at 342–45. He further rejected deterrence because 
numerous studies had been concluded there is no deterring effect and “that capital punishment is not 
necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society.” Id. at 353. Marshall rejected prevention of recidivism 
because “[f]or the most part, [defendants] are first offenders, and when released from prison they are 
known to become model citizens.” Id. at 355. He rejected the argument for encouragement for guilty 
8
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A majority of the Justices did agree, however, “death-sentencing 
systems operated in an essentially arbitrary and discriminatory 
fashion.”58 As a result of the five concurring opinions issued by the 
Justices, the Court invalidated forty-two death penalty statues as 
unconstitutional,59 leaving the states with few options. 
2. Post-Furman 
Following Furman, seven states did not try to rewrite their 
statues; 60  ten states rewrote their statutes imposing mandatory 
sentences for capital crimes;61 and twenty-five states rewrote their 
statues around the issues raised in Furman.62 The statutes of the ten 
states that imposed mandatory sentences were almost immediately 
challenged and ruled unconstitutional in Woodson v. North 
Carolina.63 
On the same day of Woodson, the Court issued the plurality 
opinion of Gregg v. Georgia,64 holding “the punishment of death 
does not invariably violate the Constitution.” 65  The Court then 
reviewed Georgia’s new death penalty statute. 66  Under the new 
Georgia law following Furman, the death penalty would only be 
imposed under a bifurcated system. 67  The case would proceed 
normally through a trial, and upon conviction, a separate hearing 
                                                                                                                 
pleas and confessions as violations of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 356. Marshall rejected eugenics 
because the “[n]ation has never formally professed eugenic goals, and the history of the world does not 
look kindly on them.” Id. See also Millett, supra note 21, at 594–95. 
 58. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 13. See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 249–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); 
id. at 293–95 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., 
concurring); id. at 364–66, 368 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 59. Millett, supra note 21, at 592. 
 60. Id. at 595. 
 61. Id. Imposing mandatory death sentences eliminated part of the discretion opposed by Justice 
Stewart in Furman. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 308–09 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also BALDUS, supra 
note 34, at 22. 
 62. See Millett, supra note 21, at 596; see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 32. 
 63. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (invalidating North 
Carolina’s mandatory death sentence statute because it did not leave room for courts to consider 
individual factors). 
 64. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 65. Id. at 169. 
 66. Id. at 162–68 (reviewing Georgia’s death sentence statute). 
 67. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31(b) (1973). 
9
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dedicated to sentencing would be conducted. 68  At this point, the 
prosecution and defense would present new evidence to the jury 
regarding the case’s extenuating, mitigating, and aggravating 
circumstances.69 Should the jury find an aggravating circumstance 
and then choose to sentence the defendant to death, the law provides 
“for a special expedited direct review by the Supreme Court of 
Georgia . . . .” 70  The Supreme Court of Georgia would not only 
review the case for misapplications of law, but would also evaluate 
the proportionality of the sentence to the crime. 71  The Court 
ultimately upheld Georgia’s new death penalty scheme.72 
In the cases that followed Gregg, the Court upheld similar 
statutory schemes of imposing the death penalty around the nation.73 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31(b). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165. Under the statute, the jury was required to find at least one aggravating 
circumstance to impose the death penalty. Id. Moreover, even if the jury found an aggravating 
circumstance, the jury could still use discretion to impose the punishment. Id. This raises questions as to 
whether the Georgia statute really removed the chance for unequal application of the death penalty. See 
also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35 (1973). 
 71. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166–67. Generally, “[p]roportionaltiy refers to the relationship of the 
punishment to the criminal conduct of the offender . . . .” William W. Berry III, Promulgating 
Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69, 87–88 (2011). Proportionality reviews consider “various individual 
interests,” on individualized bases in each case. Id. Moreover, proportionality reviews consider not only 
if a particular crime and death sentence are proportionate, but also whether a particular defendant 
received the death sentence “under circumstances that usually result in a lesser penalty.” BALDUS, supra 
note 34, at 33. 
 72. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206–07 (“The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who 
were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the procedures before the 
Court . . . [n]o longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always 
circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.”). Gregg was important because it was the first case 
following Furman that approved of a state death penalty system. See id. at 169. The U.S. Supreme Court 
approved of the Gregg procedures because it was believed they would eliminate the wanton and freakish 
death sentences seen in Furman. See id. at 207. Based on studies conducted in Connecticut, Maryland, 
and Georgia, the promise of Furman and Gregg is yet unrealized. See discussion infra Part II.B–D. 
 73. E.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The Florida statute, like Georgia’s, provided 
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances that must be considered and weighed against one 
another. Id. at 250. Florida’s statute also provided for direct review by the Supreme Court of Florida; 
although it did not require that court to consider proportionality. Id. at 251–52. Moreover, once the jury 
considers the mitigating circumstances, it merely provides a recommendation to the judge whether or 
not to impose the death penalty. Id. at 248–49. The judge has the ultimate decision on application of the 
death penalty based on his or her weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstance. Id. at 249. See also 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 263 (1976). The Texas statute, like Georgia and Florida’s, provided for a 
bifurcated system. Millett, supra note 21, at 598. However, Texas did not provide for a list of statutory 
aggravating circumstances. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270. Instead, Texas narrowed the list of crimes for which 
death could be imposed. Id. Additionally, Texas required the jury to consider a series of question: 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased 
10
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The majority of schemes incorporated three important procedural 
changes.74 First, the unitary system was replaced with a bifurcated 
system.75 Second, juries would be required to consider aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in the sentencing stage. 76  In some 
cases, state law prescribed only a limited number of aggravating 
circumstances that a jury could consider.77  Third, at least twenty 
states created a system whereby the death sentence could be 
immediately appealed to a state appeals court for review.78 
Each of these reforms was directed at resolving an issue raised by 
Furman, specifically the impermissible arbitrariness and 
discriminatory nature of death penalty laws.79 Although there has 
been some positive effect, post-Furman statutory schemes remain 
susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory results.80 Moreover, given 
the competing interests described by Justice Breyer in Glossip, the 
death penalty’s value is in greater doubt than before Furman.81 
II. ANALYSIS 
When devising a death penalty, states must consider constitutional 
limits imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Additionally, the Court 
has required the punishment to serve some legitimate purpose. This 
Part will first turn to the deterring effect of the death penalty,82 and 
                                                                                                                 
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of 
the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the 
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct 
of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the 
provocation, in any, by the deceased. 
Id. at 269. In order to impose the death penalty, the jury must answer each question affirmatively, 
otherwise a sentence of life imprisonment results. Id. 
 74. BALDUS ET AL, supra note 34, at 22–24. 
 75. Id. at 23. 
 76. Id. at 23–24. 
 77. Id. at 23. 
 78. Id. at 24. 
 79. Id. at 1–2. 
 80. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 2. 
 81. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 82. See discussion infra Part II.A. For the purposes of this Note, considerations of the “penological 
purposes” the death penalty serves are focused solely on deterrence. The focus is on deterrence because 
history has shown deterrence to be “the top argument in favor of executions.” Michael L. Radelet & 
Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 
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will then consider the Constitutional concerns of arbitrariness and 
discrimination.83 
A. Is Deterrence a Legitimate “Penological Purpose”? 
The first half of Justice Breyer’s contention in Glossip questions 
whether the death penalty provides some “penological purpose[].”84 
As Justice Marshall noted in Furman, the death penalty allegedly 
serves several purposes. 85  He further rejected each of these 
purposes,86 and each has been rejected since Furman.87 However, 
when Nebraska recently abolished the death penalty, much debate 
centered on the issue of whether or not the death penalty furthered 
the goal of deterrence. 88  Instead of conducting an individualized 
study on deterrence in Nebraska, critics and proponents relied on 
national studies related to this issue.89 
                                                                                                                 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 492 (2009). 
 83. See discussion infra Part II.B–C. 
 84. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 85. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 86. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 234–41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 87. John L. Mackie, Retribution: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 98, 98 (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds, 9th ed. 2012) (“Punitive 
retribution is the repaying of harm with harm . . . . How does the criminal’s suffering or deprivation pay 
anything to society? No doubt repaying a debt often hurts the person who pays it, but it does not follow 
that anything that hurts someone amounts to his repaying a debt . . . . So this account is simply 
incoherent . . . .”); Radelet & Lacock, supra note 82, at 489–90 (“The findings demonstrate an 
overwhelming consensus . . . that the empirical research conducted on the deterrence question strongly 
supports the conclusion that the death penalty does not add deterrent effects to those already achieved by 
long imprisonment.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New 
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 139 (2010) (“Although there is 
considerable variation today in the conduct of capital trials, it is beyond doubt that such trials are more 
extensive and expensive along virtually every dimension.”). Georgia is particularly concerned with the 
cost of its’ criminal justice system. GA. COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, REPORT OF THE 
GEORGIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 7 (2014) (discussing the results of the bipartisan, 
inter-branch Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform “to improve public safety, hold offenders 
accountable, and stabilize . . . spending”). 
 88. Compare 104 NEB. LEGIS. REC. 1, at 29 (“Most commentators who oppose capital punishment 
assert that an execution has no deterrent effect . . . . Recent evidence, however, suggests . . . an 
enormous deterrent effect on the number of murders.”), with id. at 37–38 (“[T]he death penalty doesn’t 
work, it’s not a deterrent . . . .”). 
 89. Id. The scope of this Note—which is primarily concerned with issues announced in Furman—
does not require an individualized analysis of the deterrent effect of Georgia’s death penalty system. A 
general discussion of deterrence will suffice to demonstrate the conflicting evidence of such an effect on 
criminals. 
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In 2005, Professor John J. Donohue and Assistant Professor Justin 
Wolfers compiled the results of some of the most extensive studies 
on death penalty deterrence.90 After evaluating the methods of each 
study, Donohue and Wolfers found it difficult to correlate lower 
homicide rates with greater use of the death penalty.91 They found the 
true effect of the death penalty as deterrence “reasonably close to 
zero.”92 The lack of clarity in empirical studies leaves room for both 
sides of the debate to cite relevant statistics. 
Although there is some debate, a survey conducted in 2009 by the 
world’s leading criminologists found there is “an overwhelming 
consensus . . . that the death penalty does not add deterrent effects to 
those already achieved by long imprisonment.” 93  When asked 
whether or not the death penalty acts as a general deterrent, 88.2% of 
respondents said no.94 Moreover, when asked if empirical evidence 
supported deterrent effects of the death penalty, 94.7% of 
respondents responded the evidence showed either weak or no 
support at all of deterring effects.95 Given the conflicting empirical 
evidence available, it is hard to understand how some individuals cite 
deterrence as a legitimate purpose to retain the death penalty.96 It 
appears the argument that capital punishment deters crime is 
                                                                                                                 
 90. John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty 
Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 804–18 (2005). The compilation included a study by Lawrence Katz, 
Steven D. Levitt and Ellen Shustorovich assessing executions between 1950 and 1990. Katz et al., 
Prison Conditions, Captial Punishment, and Detterence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003). A second 
study, conducted by Hashem Dezhbakhsh and Joanna M. Shepherd, assessed executions between 1960 
and 2000. Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: 
Evidence From a “Judicial Experiment”, http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017& 
context=alea (last visited Nov. 8, 2015). The final major study included by Donohue and Wolfers was 
conducted by H. Naci Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings, assessing executions between 1984 and 1997. H. Naci 
Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of 
Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453 (2003). 
 91. Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 90, at 836. 
 92. Id. (The zero deterrent effect means “one cannot confidently conclude that the evidence points to 
either deterrent or antideterrent effects”). 
 93. Radelet & Lacock, supra note 82, at 489–90. 
 94. Id. at 501 (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. at app. A. 
 96. The survey asked several questions aimed at answering this question. The survey asked whether 
the following statement was accurate or inaccurate: “Politicians support the death penalty as a symbolic 
way to show they are tough on crime.” Radelet & Lacock, supra note 82, at app. A (emphasis added). 
90.9% of respondents found this statement largely or totally accurate. Id. 
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inconclusive at best. 97  Just as likely, the deterring argument in 
support of the death penalty is flat out wrong.98 If Georgia retains the 
death penalty to serve some legitimate purpose, it appears that 
purpose cannot be based in the deterrence argument. 
B. Does Arbitrariness Persist? Consider Connecticut. 
Connecticut abolished its death penalty in 2012. 99  Instead of 
looking at the deterrence factor like Nebraska, Connecticut’s 
legislature chose to evaluate its death penalty by assessing levels of 
arbitrariness—the second half of Justice Breyer’s contention in 
Glossip.100 
1. Post-Furman Death Penalty Laws 
In 1973, Connecticut replaced its pre-Furman death penalty statute 
with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46b, listing specific categories of death-
eligible crimes.101 Upon conviction of a crime falling into one of 
those categories, a separate penalty phase was conducted.102 During 
that phase, the trier-of-fact would decide between a sentence of death 
or one of life in prison without parole.103 The statute also required the 
finding of one statutory aggravating factor,104 but the defense was 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 90, at 836. 
 98. See Radelet & Lacock, supra note 82, at 489–90. 
 99. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last modified July 1, 2015). 
 100. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning whether or 
not the system “seeks reliability and fairness,” given claims of arbitrariness in the death penalty system). 
 101. John J. Donohue III, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973–2007: A COMPREHENSIVE 
EVALUATION FROM 4686 MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 67 (2013). Death eligible offenses included: (1) 
the murder of a police officer, judicial marshal, firefighter, corrections officer, or other law enforcement 
officer in the performance of his or her duties; (2) murder for pecuniary gain, whether defendant 
committed the murder or hired someone; (3) murder by defendant with a prior conviction for either 
intentional or felony murder; (4) murder by defendant under sentence of life imprisonment at time; (5) 
murder by kidnapper of kidnapped person in course of kidnapping; (6) murder committed in course of 
sexual assault (added 1980); (7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in course of single 
transaction (added 1980); or murder of person under sixteen years of age (added 1995). Id. 
 102. See also Donohue, supra note 101, at 66. The bifurcation of the death penalty was on-trend 
following Gregg v. Georgia. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE CASE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (1992), 
http://users.rcn.com/mwood/deathpen.html. 
 103. Donohue, supra note 101, at 66. 
 104. See id., at 67. The statutory aggravating factors included: (1) murder during felony by one 
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allowed to present mitigating evidence.105 After trial, the Connecticut 
statute provided for automatic appellate review to the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut. 106  Although the statute originally required the 
Supreme Court to consider whether the “sentence [was] excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,” 107  that 
provision was repealed in 1998. 108  Compared to Georgia’s death 
penalty laws, upheld post-Furman in Gregg v. Georgia,109 the death 
penalty laws in Connecticut were remarkably similar. 
2. Arbitrariness in Connecticut 
Five of the Justices in Furman posited that the death penalty was 
unconstitutionally arbitrary in its application. 110  When used to 
challenge the death penalty in an individual case, the term arbitrary 
means the case “cannot be distinguished in a ‘meaningful’ or 
‘principled’ way from other cases that generally result in life 
sentences or less.”111 When the Connecticut legislature considered 
                                                                                                                 
previously convicted of same felony; (2) murder after two felony convictions of inflicting serious bodily 
harm; (3) murder while knowingly creating a grave risk of death to others; (4) heinous, cruel, or 
depraved murder; (5) murder for hire; (6) murder for pecuniary gain; (7) murder using an assault 
weapon; or (8) murder of public safety official. Id. 
 105. Id. at 69. Statutory mitigating factors included: (1) under age of eighteen; (2) mental capacity 
was impaired; (3) under unusual and substantial duress; or (4) could not reasonably have foreseen that 
his conduct in the course of commission would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to 
another person. Id. 
 106. S.B. 855, 1995 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Donohue, supra note 101, at 69. 
 109. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 110. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 293–95 
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at 
364–66, 368 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 13. 
 111. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 14. See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality 
opinion) (finding “no principled way to distinguish” the case before the Court from the many who 
received lesser sentences); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“If a time 
comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the 
appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a 
sentence of death.”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“For, of all the people 
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners 
are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been 
imposed.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is 
not.”). 
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and ultimately repealed its death penalty, much of the debate 
centered on the issue of arbitrariness.112 
Before abolition, Professor John J. Donohue conducted a systemic 
evaluation of Connecticut’s death penalty laws. 113  Specifically, 
Donohue looked to see if the “system in its entirety or in particular 
aspects was operating in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” 114 
Based on his research, Donohue reached three main findings 
regarding arbitrariness in Connecticut’s death penalty statute.115 
First, executions were “freakishly rare” in Connecticut. 116 
According to the Court in Furman, evidence that a penalty is 
imposed infrequently suggests its imposition is arbitrary and 
therefore unconstitutional.117 Moreover, the Court rejected Georgia’s 
statute that resulted in executions fifteen percent of the time in death-
eligible cases.118 Based on Donohue’s study, Connecticut imposed 
the death penalty only 4.4% of time,119 far lower than the statutes at 
issue in Furman. 
Second, cases where the prosecutor sought death bore no 
meaningful difference from cases without capital charges. 120  In 
Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court held “[c]apital 
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow 
                                                                                                                 
 112. An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies: Hearing on SB-280 Before the Judiciary 
Committee, 2012 Leg., 413th Sess. 1 (Conn. 2012) The committee reports the following as the reasons 
for the bill: “Statistics show the death penalty historically is not applied in a fair and impartial 
manner . . . . If even one person is sentenced to death erroneously through such an arbitrary . . . manner 
open to human error, this ultimate penalty must be abolished.” Id. 
 113. Donohue, supra note 101, at 32. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1. 
 116. Id. at 4. This rate was among the lowest in the nation. Id. Only nine out of 205 death eligible 
cases evaluated in Donohue’s study actually received the death penalty. Id. 
 117. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 118. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 80. 
In Furman v. Georgia, the infrequency with which juries actually imposed death 
sentences in death-eligible cases concerned each of the concurring justices. The 
Furman opinions suggest that the justices estimated that the national death-
sentencing rate among convicted murderers was less than 0.20. Our pre-Furman 
data from Georgia indicated an unadjusted death-sentencing rate of 0.15 
(44/294) . . . . 
Id. (endnotes omitted). See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 386 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 119. Donohue, supra note 101, at 4. 
 120. Id. at 5. 
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category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability 
makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”121 Donohue assessed 
205 capital-eligible murders using two different egregiousness 
measures and found no significant difference between criminals that 
received the death penalty and those who did not.122 
Third, Connecticut did not leave the death penalty for the worst 
cases as commanded by Roper.123 Donohue found that for some cases 
where death was imposed, sixty or more cases were more egregious 
yet did not receive the death penalty. 124  Given the remarkable 
similarities between Georgia’s current death penalty statutes and 
Connecticut’s abolished version, similar challenges made in 
Connecticut may reasonably be attributed to Georgia as well. 
C. Does Discrimination Persist? Consider Maryland. 
Five of the Justices in Furman were also concerned with 
potentially inherent discrimination.125 Justice Douglas noted that the 
discretionary death penalty statutes, a source of arbitrariness,126 were 
also “pregnant with discrimination.” 127  After Maryland conducted 
several studies, discrimination—particularly on the basis of race as a 
result of discretion in the system—was of particular concern. 128 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319) 
(holding the death penalty cannot be imposed upon juvenile offenders). 
 122. Donohue, supra note 101, at 5. 
 123. Id.; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
 124. Donohue, supra note 101, at 5. 
 125. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“It would seem to be 
incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him 
by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that 
gives room for the play of such prejudices.”) (emphasis added); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(“[A] look at the bare statistics regarding executions is enough to betray much of the discrimination . . . . 
It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to their 
percentage of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate of execution among Negroes is 
partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial discrimination.”). 
 126. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 248–49 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court previously noted the jury 
may have “untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die.” Id. at 248. But the Court 
also recognized that equal protection disallowed punishment imposed through arbitrary or 
discriminatory processes. Id. at 249. 
 127. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 128. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & ROBERT BRAME, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND’S 
DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION 4 
(2002). The study was particularly focused on the discretion at four critical points in Maryland’s capital 
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Where Connecticut focused on arbitrariness, Maryland focused on 
discrimination.129 
1. Post-Furman Death Penalty Laws in Maryland 
Following Furman, the Supreme Court of Maryland invalidated its 
own death penalty laws.130 In 1975, the Maryland legislature rewrote 
the statute and created eight categories of death-eligible crimes that 
would result in a mandatory death sentence upon conviction. 131 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Woodson v. North 
Carolina later invalidated all statutes imposing mandatory death 
sentences.132 Maryland once again faced rewriting its death penalty 
statute.133 
During 1977 and 1978, Maryland crafted a third death penalty 
statute.134 Under the new statute, the defendant must be convicted of 
first-degree murder.135 After the conviction, the trial must move to a 
penalty phase where the trier-of-fact will consider several statutory 
aggravating and mitigating factors.136 The fact-finder must then find 
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance 
                                                                                                                 
punishment system: (1) the decision of the state’s attorney to seek the death penalty, (2) the decision of 
the state’s attorney not to withdraw from seeking the death penalty, (3) the decision of the state’s 
attorney to take death-eligible cases to a penalty phase upon conviction, and (4) the decision of the trier-
of-fact to give a sentence of death. Id. at 4–5. 
 129. Id. at 1; Donohue, supra note 101, at 1. 
 130. See Bartholomey v. State, 297 A.2d 696, 701 (Md. 1972) (“We entertain not the slightest doubt 
that the imposition of the death penalty under any of the presently existing discretionary statutes of 
Maryland which authorize, but do not require, that penalty is unconstitutional under Furman as violative 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution. In other words, we think the net 
result of the holding in Furman is that the death penalty is unconstitutional when its imposition is not 
mandatory.” (footnote omitted)). 
 131. MD. CODE ANN., Murder § 27-413 (West 1978) (repealed in 2002); see also PATERNOSTER & 
BRAME, supra note 128, at 7. 
 132. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also 
PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 7. 
 133. Blackwell v. State, 365 A.2d 545, 549 (Md. 1976) (“The [Maryland death penalty] statute does 
not provide any other standards whereby the sentencing authority can consider the individual 
circumstances or characteristics of either the offense or the offender; indeed, all those convicted under 
the statute are treated alike . . . . In view of these deficiencies, the Attorney General reasons that the 
death penalty provisions . . . are unconstitutional, and we fully agree.”); see also PATERNOSTER & 
BRAME, supra note 128, at 7. 
 134. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 7. 
 135. MD. CODE ANN., Murder § 27-413 (West 1978) (repealed in 2002). 
 136. Id. 
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before death may be imposed.137 If death is imposed, the case is 
subject to automatic appellate review by the Maryland Court of 
Appeals.138 Maryland’s death penalty was remarkably similar to the 
system enacted in Georgia post-Furman. 
2. Discrimination in Maryland 
Since 1978, several studies have been conducted in Maryland to 
investigate racial discrimination.139 Professors Raymond Paternoster 
and Robert Brame conducted the most recent study, in which the pair 
focused on filling the gaps of previous studies with additional 
information. 140  Additionally, Paternoster and Brame evaluated the 
discretionary stages of a capital case in Maryland in hopes of finding 
the source of potential racial discrimination.141 
After examining approximately 6,000 murder cases,142 Paternoster 
and Brame concluded that race did in fact affect the outcome of death 
penalty cases in Maryland.143 Unlike previous reports, this case study 
accounted for 123 explanatory factors or case characteristics in order 
to accurately determine whether race and discretion affected capital 
cases.144 After accounting for these variables, the study concluded 
that race of the victim significantly affected whether courts imposed 
the death penalty.145 Paternoster and Brame found that prosecutors 
sought the death penalty 1.6 times more often in cases where the 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.; see also PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 11. 
 139. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 1. 
 140. See id. at 3. In a previous study, the authors of that study pointed out two central limitations on 
their study: “(1) their sample did not include all possible death eligible cases, and (2) they had limited 
information on the non-statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in the case and other case 
characteristics.” Id. at 3–4. 
 141. Id. at 4–5. See note 128 and accompanying text. 
 142. Id. at 12. The report was based upon an examination of approximately 6,000 first and second 
degree murders that were committed in the state of Maryland from August of 1978 until September of 
1999. Id. The study started in 1978 because that was the year the new death penalty law took effect. 
PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 12. 
 143. Id. at 32–37. 
 144. Id. at 19. The final report of the study included Table 9, which listed all case characteristics the 
study considered. Id. at tbl. 9. Some examples of case characteristics include whether the defendant had 
prior convictions, it was a multiple victim case, the defendant had history of abuse, the victim was 
mutilated, the victim was killed execution style, the victim was pregnant, etc. Id. 
 145. Id. at 33. 
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victim was white than when the victim was black.146 Moreover, the 
probability of actually receiving a death sentence is two times higher 
in a white-victim case than in a non-white-victim case.147 
The study was equally disparaging when considering racial 
makeup in the combination of offender and victim. When Paternoster 
and Brame considered the racial makeup of the offender and victim 
in tandem, they concluded that “black offenders who slay white 
victims are more likely to be sentenced to death than other racial 
combinations . . . .”148 In fact, prosecutors are twice as likely to seek 
the death penalty in black-on-white cases than black-on-black 
cases, 149  and 1.7 times more likely than in white-on-white 
cases. 150 The study suggests that even when considering 123 
additional factors, these racial disparities “cannot be 
explained . . . .”151 Paternoster and Brame note that these disparities 
develop at the early stages of a capital case where prosecutors 
possess the most discretion,152 which may in itself suggest a causal 
source. 
D. Georgia’s Death Penalty 
Deterrence is universally a suspect excuse to retain the death 
penalty. 153  Moreover, arbitrariness and discrimination existed in 
death penalty systems remarkably similar to Georgia’s current capital 
punishment law.154 This suggests that Georgia’s system may also be 
arbitrarily and discriminatorily defective. An extensive study 
examined whether Georgia’s system does in fact exhibit those 
unconstitutional qualities. 
                                                                                                                 
 146. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 34. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 35–36. 
 149. Id. at 36. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 32. 
 152. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 41. 
 153. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 154. See discussion supra Part II.B–C. 
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1. Arbitrariness in Georgia 
David C. Baldus organized a study (Baldus study) in which he 
gathered statistics and used them to try to determine whether courts 
arbitrarily imposed the death penalty on murder convicts. 155  The 
authors reached four conclusions. First, the post-Furman reforms to 
Georgia’s death penalty statute did in fact result in increased 
consistency among murder cases that received the death sentence.156 
Excessive sentences dropped from 43% pre-Furman to 13% post-
Furman. 157  This meant that the death penalty was applied more 
selectively. 158  However, this change was the extent of positive 
improvement following Furman. 
The second finding showed the number of death sentences 
imposed was substantially lower than that authorized by Georgia 
law. 159  This poses a problem because the Justices in Furman 
suggested that infrequency of death sentences tended to prove the 
penalty was arbitrary.160 Third, Georgia’s statutory requirement of an 
aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty did “not serve 
                                                                                                                 
 155. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 98. 
 156. Id. at 97. This study was conducted with an eye toward comparing pre-Furman and post-Furman 
changes in arbitrariness and discrimination in Georgia, and is thus more illustrative of the thesis of this 
Note: the promise of Furman remains unfulfilled. Id. at 98. However, recent studies reached similar 
conclusions as the Baldus study. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Race and Death Sentencing in 
Georgia, 1989-1998, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN 
STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE GEORGIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT app., at S–T 
(2006) (reaching similar findings “consistent with many other post-Furman studies,” regarding the death 
penalty in Georgia). 
 157. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 92. The authors state that excessiveness is the “central defect of 
arbitrary death sentences.” Id. at 14. The death sentence, according to the authors, is excessive “if it is so 
infrequently imposed among a group of similarly situated capital defendants that it offends basic notions 
of evenhandedness and comparative justice.” Id. 
 158. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 92. 
 159. Id. at 97. 
 160. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I simply conclude 
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under 
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”); id. at 311, 
313 (White, J., concurring) (“I begin with what I consider a near truism: that the death penalty could so 
seldom be imposed that it would cease to be a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other 
end of punishment . . . . But however that may be, I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes 
before us now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too 
attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.”); see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 80 (“In 
Furman v. Georgia, the infrequency with which juries actually imposed death sentences in death-
eligible cases concerned each of the concurring justices.”). 
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in practice to distinguish murder cases in which death sentences are 
routinely imposed from those that normally result in a life 
sentence.”161 Both findings posed a problem because they are both 
directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s expectations expressed in 
Gregg.162 
Finally, the study found that prosecutors and juries did not reserve 
the death penalty for the most severe cases.163 In fact, 15%–30% of 
death sentences appeared to be excessive as defined by the study.164 
Moreover, nearly one-half of Georgia’s death sentences post-Furman 
showed some evidence of excessiveness. 165  This information 
provides strong evidence that Georgia’s death penalty statute still 
produces arbitrary results contrary to Furman. 
2. Discrimination in Georgia 
The Baldus study also questioned whether race determined if a 
defendant received the death penalty.166 Much like the results of the 
Maryland study,167 the Baldus study found that the defendant’s race 
did not have much impact on whether the death penalty was 
imposed.168 However, when the study examined effects with varying 
races of the victim, the results showed a victim’s race remained 
                                                                                                                 
 161. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 97. 
 162. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154, 154 (1976) (plurality opinion). “The basic concern of Furman 
centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under 
the procedures before the Court . . . [n]o longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death 
sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.” Id. at 206–07; see also BALDUS, 
supra note 34, at 97. 
 163. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 97–98. 
 164. Id. at 98. See note 157 and accompany text for definition of “excessive.” 
 165. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 98. 
 166. See id. at 32. 
 167. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 168. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 149. 
[A]t each point . . . the predicted likelihood of a death sentence is lower for black-
defendant/white-victim cases than it is for the white-defendant/white-victim 
cases. However . . . a race-of-defendant effect reemerges when one examines 
separately the cases from urban rural areas. The rural cases suggest black 
defendants were still at a slight disadvantage, although the effect is not 
statistically significant. In urban Georgia, we find a statistically significant race-
of-defendant effect that disadvantaged white defendants. 
Id. at 150 (endnote omitted). 
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significant.169 In fact, in all cases where the victim was white the 
study found a 27% likelihood the death sentence would be 
imposed,170 compared to only a 7% chance when the victim was 
black.171 This meant the death penalty was sought 3.9 times more 
often in white-victim cases than in black-victim cases.172 
The Baldus study concluded that these clearly discriminatory 
results originated at two points of discretion: the prosecutor’s 
decision to seek or waive the death penalty following trial and the 
jury’s decision to impose a life sentence or death.173 At each stage, 
the study found that race was a factor for both the prosecutor and 
jury.174 Significantly, in all cases where the victim was white, the 
prosecutor and jury were more likely to seek and impose the death 
penalty when the defendant was black instead of white.175 In addition 
to the arbitrary results previously discussed,176 the statistics provided 
in the Baldus study tend to prove a clear racial bias in Georgia when 
the death penalty is sought and imposed. 
III. PROPOSAL 
In Glossip, Justice Breyer reiterated Supreme Court precedent, 
which found “the finality of death creates a ‘qualitative difference’ 
between the death penalty and other punishments.” 177  Therefore, 
there is “a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific 
case.” 178  However, the corresponding procedural safeguards 
necessary to ensure reliability “lead to a . . . constitutional problem: 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at tbl. 32. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 161. 
 174. See id. When the data is not adjusted for case culpability, the data show effects of race in 
prosecutorial and jury discretion. Id. However, the adjusted data show race remains significant. Id. at 
tbls. 38–41. 
 175. See id. at tbls. 38–39. 
 176. See discussion supra Part II.D.1. 
 177. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
 178. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added). 
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excessively long periods of time that individuals typically spend on 
death row, alive but under sentence of death.”179 
Traditionally, the death penalty allegedly served three purposes: 
deterrence, retribution, or incapacitation.180 Justice Breyer finds the 
argument in favor of deterrence unpersuasive, relying on studies that 
provide conflicting results regarding the general deterrent effect of 
the death penalty. 181  Similarly, Justice Breyer questions the 
retribution value of a significantly delayed execution.182 He finds the 
relevant question is whether retribution is really served when finality 
only comes decades later, if ever.183 Just as he finds life in prison 
without parole a suitable substitute to achieve incapacitation, that 
punishment is also sufficient to serve the purpose of retribution.184 
Justice Breyer concludes that a procedurally fair and reliable death 
penalty undermines the purpose for using the punishment at all,185 
but if the death penalty was structured to minimize delay the courts 
could not ensure it was imposed reliably.186 
The task of creating a death penalty system that provides both a 
“penological purpose” and simultaneously seeks “reliability and 
fairness” in its application is a daunting, if not an impossible task.187 
It is clear contemporary death penalty systems raise severe 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Finding the length of delay to have increased 
significantly over the years, Justice Breyer concluded such delay caused serious constitutional concerns. 
Id. Significantly, “delays undermine the death penalty’s penological rationale,” which traditionally 
“rests upon society’s need to secure deterrence, incapacitation, [or] retribution . . . .” Id. at 2767. 
Incapacitation is served just as well by sentencing a defendant to life in prison without parole. Id. Justice 
Breyer notes that rehabilitation is also a classical rationale for punishment, but capital punishment by 
definition does not rehabilitate. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2767–68; see also discussion supra Part II.A. 
 182. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769. 
 183. Id. (citing Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 184. Id. The value of retribution is based on an individual’s personal opinion. Id. Even still, there is 
debate as to whether retribution is a valid reason to punish. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
Unlike retribution, deterrence is not a policy question that is debatable; either a deterrent effect exists or 
it does not. Millett, supra note 21, at 597. 
 185. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772. “[D]elay is in part a problem that the Constitution’s own demands 
create.” Id. at 2764. 
 186. Id. “A death penalty system that is unreliable or procedurally unfair would violate the Eight 
Amendment. And so would a system that, if reliable and fair in its application of the death penalty, 
would serve no legitimate penological purpose.” Id. at 2772. 
 187. Id. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional concerns regarding arbitrariness and discrimination.188 
Thus, it is imperative that Georgia takes some action to guarantee 
justice for criminal defendants and provide value in the application of 
criminal punishment. There are two potential avenues for Georgia to 
pursue: abolition or reform. 
A. Abolition 
Abolition of the death penalty remains a clear and simple solution 
to all the problems posed by retention and implementation of the 
punishment. The death penalty provides no real penological 
purpose. 189  Instead, the system provides only arbitrary and 
discriminatory results.190 Moreover, the difficulty of resolving those 
flaws while balancing the need to retain a legitimate purpose, as 
previously noted, is near impossible.191 Additionally, retention of the 
death penalty in itself—setting aside the need for essential reforms—
is more costly than abolition.192 
Although the problems of retention and benefits of abolition are 
readily apparent, the political realities in the United States and 
Georgia make abolition an unlikely solution to the problems posed by 
the current death penalty scheme.193 In a recent poll conducted by 
Gallup, 61% of Americans favor the death penalty for a person 
convicted of murder while only 37% disfavor it.194 Although this is 
the highest level of disapproval since March of 1972,195 a strong 
majority clearly supports the death penalty nationally. Given this 
political reality, Georgia legislators will most likely forgo this option 
                                                                                                                 
 188. See discussion supra Parts II.B–D; Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2776 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 189. See supra Parts II.A, III. 
 190. See supra Part II.B–D. 
 191. See supra Parts III.A.1–2. 
 192. Steiker, supra note 87, at 139 (“Although there is considerable variation today in the conduct of 
capital trials, it is beyond doubt that such trials are more extensive and expensive along virtually every 
dimension.”). 
 193. Russell D. Covey, Death in Prison: The Right Death Penalty Compromise, 28 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1085, 1121–22 (2012) (“The largest obstacle to abolition of the death penalty . . . is its continuing 
political popularity, no doubt fueled in large part by the widely shared belief that murderers deserve 
‘death,’ not ‘life.’”). 
 194. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited Dec. 
16, 2015). 
 195. Id. 
25
Newsome: A Promise Unfulfilled: Challenges To Georgia’s Death Penalty Statute Post-Furman
Published by Reading Room, 2017
864 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
to eliminate the threats posed by the current death penalty scheme. 
Therefore, legislators may only work to diminish the ill effects in the 
system through reform by fighting the competing interests cited by 
Justice Breyer in Glossip. 
B. Reform the Current System 
Issues related to the death penalty are attributed to the great 
discretion granted to prosecutors and juries.196  Therefore, reforms 
should be aimed at meaningful limitations of discretion without 
conflicting with Supreme Court precedent. 
1. Limiting Jury Discretion 
Georgia’s contemporary death penalty statute was largely upheld 
because the Supreme Court found sufficient procedural safeguards—
relying primarily on statutorily defined aggravating factors—to 
eliminate the arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the death 
penalty by the jury.197 Based on the Baldus study, however, it is clear 
that the statutory aggravating factors have not carried the weight 
envisioned by the Gregg court.198 
First, it may be “impossible to construct a verbal formula that 
would permit different juries to make reasonably consistent 
comparative judgments about the relative blameworthiness of 
different defendants, much less to decide in any consistent fashion 
which of those defendants should live and which of them should 
die.” 199  Meaningful reform aimed at eliminating arbitrary or 
                                                                                                                 
 196. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 4–5. 
 197. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154, 206–07 (plurality opinion) (“The new Georgia sentencing 
procedures . . . focus the jury’s attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized 
characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may 
impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury’s discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly 
and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.”). 
Specifically, the addition of statutory aggravating factors would give greater guidance to prosecutors 
and juries. See BALDUS, supra note 34, at 409. 
 198. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 410 (“[T]he statutory aggravating factors do not appear to ‘guide’ in 
any meaningful way either the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in deciding when to seek a death 
sentence or the exercise of jury sentencing discretion.”). 
 199. Id. 
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discriminatory results, by minimizing jury discretion, runs the risk of 
running afoul the Supreme Court’s prohibition against mandatory 
death sentences in Woodson v. North Carolina.200 
Second, if it is possible to create a formula for the jury to follow, 
the current laws fail to achieve any real limits on discretion. 
Although Georgia law provides a list of statutory aggravating factors, 
it also allows the jury to consider “any . . . circumstances otherwise 
authorized by law . . . .”201 As a result, statutory aggravating factors 
are unable to “impose any degree of regularity upon sentencing 
decisions . . . .” 202  The results of the Baldus study bear out these 
results, finding statutory aggravating factors only “exert . . . a modest 
influence on the actual sentencing results.”203 
2. Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion 
Similar to juries, statutorily defined aggravating factors have failed 
to limit cases in which prosecutors choose to pursue the death 
penalty.204 Recently, the American Bar Association’s Death Penalty 
Moratorium Implementation Project (the Project) conducted an 
assessment of Georgia’s death penalty system.205 At the outset, the 
Project acknowledged that “[t]he character, quality, and efficiency of 
the whole system is shaped in great measure by the manner in which 
the prosecutor exercises his or her broad discretionary powers.”206 
Although the Project makes several recommendations to improve the 
quality of prosecutions, there were no recommendations designed to 
directly limit prosecutorial discretion.207  Reforms should make an 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (plurality opinion) (invalidating mandatory death 
sentence statute because it did not leave room for courts to consider individual factors). “[U]nless we 
return to the mandatory death penalty struck down in Woodson, the constitutionality of capital 
punishment rests on its limited application to the worst of the worst. And this extensive body of 
evidence suggests that is not so limited.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
 201. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b) (2015). 
 202. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 410. 
 203. Id. at 411. 
 204. See supra text accompanying note 198. 
 205. AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: 
THE GEORGIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT i (2006). 
 206. Id. at 109. 
 207. Id. at 122–30. The Project recommended that Georgia: (1) establish written policies and 
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attempt to directly address the broad discretion granted to 
prosecutors. 
3. Solution 
The Supreme Court requires current schemes to strike a balance 
between granting prosecutors and juries discretion and enough 
guidance to reach consistent and proportionate results between cases. 
Attempts to even curtail, but not entirely remove, their discretion 
have been struck down.208 I suggest two reforms to the system. 
For the first reform, give the trial judge the authority to impose the 
death penalty and take the question away from the jury entirely. 
Importantly, the jury would still be required to explicitly find 
aggravating and mitigating factors, but the judge would be the sole 
arbiter of those facts. This will allow the judge to decide, as a matter 
of law and on balance of all relevant circumstances, whether a 
defendant should be sentenced to death. Judges are better situated to 
review the case and decide whether the punishment is proportionate 
to sentences imposed for similarly situated defendants and crimes. 
Allowing the trial judge to perform a proportionality review, rather 
than waiting for the Supreme Court of Georgia to do so when the 
convicted defendant inevitably appeals, will help eliminate both 
arbitrary and discriminatory applications of the death penalty at an 
earlier stage. Additionally, allowing the judge to decide may expedite 
the process. Juries perform well when asked to determine issues of 
fact in a single case. However, they are totally incapable of 
comparing results in their own case to the results of another. The 
Supreme Court upheld a similar reform in Proffitt v. Florida.209 
                                                                                                                 
guidelines for imposing the death penalty; (2) establish policies in state laboratories for the handling of 
evidence; and (3) provide funding for training and continuing education of all state prosecutors. Id. The 
State of Georgia is in compliance with some of these recommendations, but the Project could not make 
an accurate determination in some cases because Georgia’s records are not complete. Id. 
 208. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (plurality opinion). The U.S. Supreme Court 
invalidated North Carolina’s death penalty statute because it did not give juries the opportunity to 
consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances when determining whether or not to impose the 
death penalty. Millett, supra note 21, at 596. 
 209. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260. The Florida statute, like Georgia’s, provides statutory 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that must be considered and weighed against one another by 
the jury. Id. at 250. However, the judge has the ultimate decision on application of the death penalty 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss3/7
2017] A PROMISE UNFULFILLED 867 
An alternative would allow juries to make a recommendation to 
the trial judge, but only after the jury has been presented with 
additional evidence. Presenting the jury with evidence from the 
sentencing stages of other cases similar to the present case allows the 
jury to review their own decision for proportionality. This would give 
the jury more information to make a recommendation, with 
proportionality as a factor, and would work to help resolve some of 
the problems.210 This alternative, however, would almost certainly 
lengthen the trial process and would not help promote a purpose of 
the death penalty due to the extra delay. Therefore, this alternative 
should only be considered if the legislators are concerned the first 
option would be challenged in the courts and ultimately ruled 
unconstitutional. 
For the second reform, the trial judge should have the opportunity 
to review the case for aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a 
pretrial hearing. For the purposes of the hearing, the judge will ask: if 
the defendant is found guilty and a jury finds the necessary facts, 
would I impose the death penalty? This second reform will provide a 
much needed check on prosecutorial discretion because the judge 
will be able to decide at the outset whether he or she will allow the 
                                                                                                                 
based on his or her weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstance and is free to take or decline the 
jury recommendation. Id. at 249. Florida’s statute was recently ruled unconstitutional. Hurst v. Florida, 
136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016). However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling was based on the fact that juries 
in Florida would provide recommendations on unspecified factual findings. Id. at 622. As a result, the 
judge was sentencing defendants to death on the judge’s own findings and the jury’s role was 
superfluous. Id. To respond to this challenge, Georgia legislators could reform the system to prohibit the 
jury from providing a recommendation at all, and instead require very detailed factual findings on 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances from the jury. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Those States that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge 
may . . . do so—by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the sentence phase . . . .”). The 
trial judge would then only be allowed to sentence the defendant based on those explicit factual findings 
by the jury. This reform would still allow for the benefit of limiting jury discretion while remaining 
within Constitutional bounds. 
 210. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 8–9 (discussing issues related to jury discretion). The death penalty is 
a punishment that requires both subjective and objective application. Subjectively, the jury must ask: on 
all the facts of this case, does this person deserve to be executed? But that decision must be objectively 
appropriate when compared to all the other capital crimes where the death penalty is both imposed and 
not imposed. Juries are limited to evidence of the present trial in order to determine guilt or innocence 
and life or death, and are therefore unable to adequately judge the objective application of death in any 
particular case. Short of taking the question from the jury entirely, the next best option is to give the 
necessary information to the jury in order for it to make a constitutionally sound decision. 
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death penalty to be imposed. Once again, the judge will be allowed to 
conduct a proportionality review and will be able to decide as a 
matter of law if the circumstances warrant the death penalty, but will 
be able to do so at the outset of trial. Moreover, this reform will 
potentially help reduce time and costs of trying a capital crime where 
the death penalty would not otherwise be imposed. Although trial 
judges in practice may give deference to the prosecutor, the reform 
will at least provide judges a tool to check the prosecutor’s broad 
discretion. Together, these reforms strike a balance of improving the 
current system on efficiency while ensuring that criminal defendants 
are protected from arbitrary and discriminatory results. 
CONCLUSION 
In the past three years, Nebraska, Connecticut, and Maryland have 
abolished the death penalty. Although they did so for different 
reasons, each state ultimately decided the total cost—both 
procedurally and financially—was greater than the value the death 
penalty provides. The problems these states exhibit clearly 
demonstrate the tension recognized by Justice Breyer in Glossip. The 
need to have a fair and reliable death penalty invariably conflicts 
with the state’s ability to craft a system that simultaneously serves 
some legitimate purpose. 
Since Furman, several states have attempted to craft such a 
system, but it is evident based on recent studies that the promise of 
Furman has not been achieved. Respectively, Nebraska, Connecticut, 
and Maryland chose to abolish the death penalty because it does not 
deter capital crime, is arbitrary in application, and is demonstrably 
discriminatory. The flaws of these systems, which are based on 
Georgia’s death penalty approved in Gregg, are directly attributable 
to Georgia as well. Abolition is the best option for Georgia 
legislators, but is highly unlikely given the political pressure to retain 
the death penalty. In lieu of abolition, meaningful reform may be 
possible to achieve while also protecting purpose and reliability. 
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